

Message Text

PAGE 01 STATE 202422 TOSEC 100144

73

ORIGIN PA-02

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SS-15 PRS-01 USIA-15 INR-07 NSC-05

CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /046 R

DRAFTED BY PA/M:JCHAMBERLAIN:JC

APPROVED BY PA/M:WJDYESS

S/S:FORTIZ

DESIRED DISTRIBUTION

PA, S/S, S/PRS

----- 070272

P 252343Z AUG 75 ZFF4

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USDEL SECRETARY PRIORITY

UNCLAS STATE 202422 TOSEC 100144

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: SOPN, US, XC, PFOR

SUBJECT: PRESS MATERIAL

1. HERewith FULL TEXT RICHARD DUDMAN THIRD PAGE BYLINER, MONDAY, AUGUST 25, WASHINGTON STAR, HEADLINED "WITH THE POWER COMES THE BLAME: KISSINGER ROLE CALLED STRONG IN SECRECY OF INDOCHINA POLICIES."

2. A FORMER HIGH PENTAGON OFFICIAL TRIED TO SUM UP HENRY A. KISSINGER'S IMPACT ON AMERICAN MILITARY POLICY: "HENRY HAS A TENDENCY TO BE SPASTIC USING MILITARY HARDWARE."

3. ANOTHER CRITICISM LINKS HIM CLOSELY WITH THE SECRECY AND DECEPTION OF THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION, PARTICULARLY IN MANAGING THE VIETNAM WAR.

4. STILL ANOTHER COMPLAINT HAS TO DO WITH KISSINGER AS A NEGOTIATOR. WHILE CONCEDING HIS BRILLIANCE, SOME CRITICS QUESTION THE VALUE OF THE END PRODUCT OF THE SPECTACULAR UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 STATE 202422 TOSEC 100144

DEALS.

5. PARTLY THROUGH HIS OWN EXPERTISE AND THE FORCE OF HIS PERSONALITY, PARTLY THROUGH HIS DUAL ROLE AS SECRETARY OF

STATE AND ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY

AFFAIRS, KISSINGER EXERTS GREAT POWER ON THE POLICIES AND ACTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT. THESE CRITICISMS BEAR ON WHAT HE DOES WITH THAT POWER.

6. AS FOR THE VIETNAM WAR, KISSINGER AND FORMER PRESIDENT RICHARD M. NIXON WORKED SO CLOSELY ON IT THAT FORMER AIDES NOW FIND IT HARD TO DISTINGUISH THEIR VIEWS AND IMPACTS ON EVENTS. TOGETHER, THEY KEPT THE WAR GOING FOR AN ADDITIONAL FOUR YEARS, PLUS ANOTHER TWO YEARS WITHOUT AMERICAN TROOPS BUT WITH US ARMS AND DOLLARS, IN THE HOPE THAT EVENTUALLY THEY COULD EXTRICATE THE UNITED STATES IN A WAY THAT WOULD LEAVE AN ANTI-COMMUNIST GOVERNMENT IN SOUTH VIETNAM.

7. PERSONS FAMILIAR WITH POLICY FORMATION THROUGH THE FIRST NIXON TERM SAY DEFENSE SECRETARY MELVID R. LAIRD AND SECRETARY OF STATE WILLIAM P. ROGERS WERE SECRET DOVES, TRYING ABOVE ALL ELSE TO GET THE US TROOPS OUT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

8. THEY SAY THAT KISSINGER, ON THE OTHER HAND, WAS ALWAYS THINKING HE COULD NEGOTIATE A SETTLEMENT THAT WOULD PROVIDE A GOOD CHANCE FOR THE SURVIVAL OF AN ANTI-COMMUNIST GOVERNMENT, AND THAT HE WAS WILLING TO RISK THOUSANDS OF ADDITIONAL US CASUALTIES AND EVENTUAL POLITICAL DISASTER AT HOME IN THAT HOPE.

9. IN LATE 1968, ACCORDING TO ONE OF THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE JOHNSON-NIXON TRANSITION ARRANGEMENTS, LEADING DEMOCRATS OFFERED WHAT THEY THOUGHT WOULD BE A SOLUTION TO THE STALLED WAR THAT WAS TEARING THIS COUNTRY APART.

10. THEY PROPOSED TO SUPPORT A MOVE BY NIXON TO DROP THE DREAM OF A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION OF THE WAR, STOP WORRYING TOO MUCH ABOUT WHETHER THE COMMUNISTS WOULD TAKE OVER, UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 STATE 202422 TOSEC 100144

AND NEGOTIATE A QUICK PEACE THAT WOULD GET THE UNITED STATES OUT OF THE INDOCHINA MORASS. THEY ARGUED THAT NIXON COULD MAKE HIMSELF A NATIONAL HERO BY STOPPING THE BLOODSHED AND THE DIVISIVE NATIONAL DEBATE.

11. ONE OF THOSE WHO PRESENTED THE IDEA SAYS KISSINGER APPEARED INTERESTED AND SAID, "PRESIDENT NIXON MUST HEAR THIS." BUT NOTHING CAME OF IT. THERE WAS NO SIGN THAT KISSINGER OR NIXON EVER CONSIDERED ANYTHING BUT THEIR LONG AND ULTIMATELY UNSUCCESSFUL QUEST FOR WHAT NIXON CALLED "PEACE WITH HONOR."

12. THEIR METHODS INCLUDED THE SECRET BOMBING OF NEUTRAL

CAMBODIA, WHICH STARTED TWO MONTHS AFTER NIXON TOOK OFFICE,

THE U.S. INVASION OF CAMBODIA IN 1970 AND FURIOUS RAIDS BY B52 BOMBERS AGAINST NORTH VIETNAMESE CITIES AS A STICK APPLIED AT CRUCIAL POINTS IN THE INTERMITTENT NEGOTIATIONS.

13. SOURCES IN THE PENTAGON, STATE DEPARTMENT AND THE

WHITE HOUSE AGREE THAT ALTHOUGH KISSINGER PERSUADED FRIENDLY NEWSPAPER COLUMNISTS AND MEMBERS OF CONGRESS THAT HE WAS A FORCE FOR MODERATION, HE ACTUALLY WAS PRESSING FOR EXTENDED BOMBING RAIDS AND OTHER WAYS TO EXPAND THE WAR.

14. THE FORMER OFFICIALS SAY LAIRD AND ROGERS CONSISTENTLY PRESSED FOR ACCELERATED "VIETNAMIZATION" OF THE WAR--AS A EUPHEMISM FOR US WITHDRAWAL--AND OPPOSED MANY OF KISSINGER'S PROPOSALS TO ESCALATE US ATTACKS.

15. "LAIRD AND ROGERS WERE DOVES, BUT HENRY CLEARLY WAS IN CONTROL OF THE PROCESS," SAYS A FORMER MEMBER OF KISSINGER'S NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL STAFF. "HE UNDERSTOOD THAT THE PERSON WHO WAS FIRST WITH A MEMO TO THE PRESIDENT CARRIED THE DAY. LAIRD'S AND ROGERS' MEMOS WENT THROUGH KISSINGER, WHO WOULD WRITE A COVERING MEMO AND CONTROL THE ACTION."

16. THE FORMER STAFFER SAID KISSINGER WAS ALWAYS PRESENT
UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 04 STATE 202422 TOSEC 100144

WHEN ROGERS SAW THE PRESIDENT: "ROGERS WOULD CALL HALDEMAN AND SAY HE NEEDED TO SEE NIXON. HALDEMAN WOULD SAY NIXON WAS BUSY. ROGERS DIDN'T FIGHT IT, AND WHEN I SAW THAT I SAID TO MYSELF, 'BOY, THE BALL GAME'S OVER.' AS HENRY BECAME MORE AND MORE OPERATIVE, ROGERS SORT OF EVAPORATED AND BECAME A CENTRAL-CASTING VERSION OF SECRETARY OF STATE."

17. KISSINGER DECLINES TO DISCUSS SUCH MATTERS ON THE RECORD. HIS POSITION IS KNOWN TO BE THAT HE NEVER SUPPRESSED OR SHORT-CIRCUITED THE VIEWS OF ROGERS AND LAIRD; THAT THEY NEVER RAISED SERIOUS OR SUSTAINED OBJECTIONS TO THE WAR POLICY AS DID GEORGE W. BALL IN THE JOHNSON ADMINISTRATION; AND THAT, INsofar AS ROGERS WAS PUSHED ASIDE, THE PRESIDENT WANTED IT THAT WAY.

18. ROGERS DECLINES TO DISCUSS THE MATTER. HE SAYS HE HAS DECIDED NOT TO GIVE ANY INTERVIEWS OR WRITE HIS MEMOIRS. THE ONLY WRITING HE IS CONSIDERING, HE SAYS, IS A BOOK ON THE LIGHTER SIDE OF GOVERNMENT.

19. LAIRD FOUGHT IT OUT WITH KISSINGER TIME AFTER TIME ON PROPOSED TROOP WITHDRAWALS AND BOMBING RAIDS, SOMETIMES

WINNING A POINT, SOMETIMES LOSING, ACCORDING TO A FORMER AIDE. HE SAYS THEY REMAINED FRIENDLY, ALTHOUGH LAIRD HAS BEGUN ATTACKING KISSINGER'S NUCLEAR POLICIES AND IS SAID TO BE ONE OF THOSE SPREADING THE VIEW THAT KISSINGER HAS HAD TOO MUCH POWER TOO LONG.

20. PLANNING FOR THE CAMBODIA INVASION OF 1970 WAS HANDLED IN A SORT OF AXIS BETWEEN KISSINGER AND THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, WITH NIXON GIVING THE FINAL APPROVAL, ACCORDING TO SEVERAL WHO TOOK PART.

21. MILITARY LEADERS LONG HAD BEEN ADVOCATING A US GROUND STRIKE TO BREAK UP VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST SANCTUARIES ACROSS THE CAMBODIAN BORDER. WITH THE OVERTHROW OF PRINCE

NORODOM SIHANOUK IN MARCH 1970, IT SUDDENLY APPEARED POLITICALLY FEASIBLE.

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 05 STATE 202422 TOSEC 100144

22. A FORMER OFFICIAL SAYS THAT LAIRD AND ROGERS STRONGLY OPPOSED ANY USE OF US TROOPS IN CAMBODIA BUT WERE CUT OUT OF THE PLANNING MEETINGS THAT LED UP TO THE DECISION. SO WAS A PENTAGON VIETNAM TASK FORCE THAT WAS MEETING THREE OR FOUR TIMES A WEEK IN STRATEGY SESSIONS.

23. AT ONE POINT, THE FORMER OFFICIAL RECALLS, KISSINGER SENT WORD TO ADM. THOMAS H. MOORER, CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS AND ACTING CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, TO COME TO ONE OF THE FINAL PLANNING MEETINGS--AS THE MILITARY ADVISER TO THE PRESIDENT, NOT IN HIS ROLE AS ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE.

24. MOORER IS SAID TO HAVE ASKED BLUNTLY, "DOES THIS MEAN LAIRD IS NOT COMING?"

25. THAT WAS EXACTLY WHAT IT MEANT. AT THE CRUCIAL MEETING, APPARENTLY ON THURSDAY, APRIL 23, THE ONLY PARTICIPANTS ARE SAID TO HAVE BEEN KISSINGER, MOORER, CIA DIRECTOR RICHARD HELMS AND HIS DEPUTY, LT. GEN. ROBERT E. CUSHMAN JR.

26. AT A FINAL MEETING THE FOLLOWING SUNDAY, AFTER ;HE DECISION HAD BEEN FORMULATED AND ALL BUT COMPLETED, LAIRD AND ROGERS, AS WELL AS NIXON AND VICE PRESIDENT SPIRO T. AGNEW, WERE PRESENT AT A FORMAL MEETING OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL.

27. ONE OF KISSINGER'S AIDES AT THE TIME RECALLS A TELEPHONE CALL FROM NIXON TO KISSINGER FROM THE PRESIDENTIAL

HELICOPTER FOR A FINAL WORD AS THE OPERATION WAS ABOUT TO GET UNDER WAY. AFTER NIXON HAD SPOKEN, NIXON'S CRONY, BEBE REBOZO, TOOK THE PHONE AND ADDED A COMMENT OF HIS OWN: "AND, HENRY, IF THIS DOESN'T WORK, IT'S YOUR ASS."

28. KISSINGER WOULD NOT DISCUSS THE EPISODE FOR THE RECORD, BUT HIS VERSION IS SAID TO SHOW THAT LAIRD AND ROGERS WERE PART OF THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS AT ALL STAGES. A MAIN POINT OF THE KISSINGER VERSION IS THAT NIXON, NOT KISSINGER, WAS THE ONE WHO INSISTED ON THE USE UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 06 STATE 202422 TOSEC 100144

OF AMERICAN TROOPS.

29. ACCORDING TO THIS VERSION, THE PLAN FORMULATED AT THE THURSDAY MEETING INVOLVED ONLY SOUTH VIETNAMESE TROOPS, BUT WITH US AIR SUPPORT. ON SATURDAY, HOWEVER, NIXON IS SAID TO HAVE SUMMONED KISSINGER TO CAMP DAVID AND TOLD HIM, "THIS IS RIDICULOUS. IF WE'RE GOING TO DO IT, WE SHOULD DO IT RIGHT. WE SHOULD USE AMERICAN TROOPS."

30. AT THE SUNDAY MEETING OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL, WITH LAIRD AND ROGERS PRESENT, THE DECISION ON US TROOPS WAS STILL OPEN, ACCORDING TO THE KISSINGER VERSION, ALTHOUGH NIXON WAS LEANING TOWARD USING A US GROUND FORCE.

31. IN THIS VERSION, NIXON MET AGAIN WITH LAIRD AND ROGERS ON MONDAY MORNING, THE 27TH, AND TOLD THEM HE WOULD MAKE THE DECISION THAT NIGHT. IN THE MEANTIME HE ASKED THE JUDGMENT OF GEN. CREIGHTON W. ABRAMS, COMMANDER OF US FORCES IN VIETNAM. ABRAMS IS SAID TO HAVE RECOMMENDED THE USE OF AMERICAN TROOPS. NIXON'S SPEECH ANNOUNCING THE START OF THE "INCURSION" WAS DELIVERED THURSDAY, APRIL 30.

32. WAS KISSINGER AN ADVOCATE, OR WAS HE MERELY THE CONVEYOR OF OPTIONS, AS HIS VERSION SUGGESTS? ONE OF THE GROUP OF HIS DOVISH AIDES WHOM KISSINGER USED TO CALL "MY BLEEDING HEARTS" STILL CAN'T DECIDE. HE REMAINS PUZZLED ABOUT WHETHER KISSINGER'S STRONG SUPPORT FOR THE INVASION WAS BECAUSE OF HEAVY PRESSURES FROM ABOVE OR BECAUSE HE TRULY FAVORED THE PLAN.

33. "THERE WERE OCCASIONS ON OTHER ISSUES WHERE A STAFF MEMBER WOULD OBJECT AND KISSINGER WOULD SYMPATHIZE IN SOME OVERT WAY," THE FORMER STAFF MEMBER SAID. "HE DIDN'T DO IT THIS TIME. BUT EVEN IF HE HAD SAID, 'DEEP DOWN INSIDE I SYMPATHIZE WITH YOU,' IT STILL WOULDN'T NECESSARILY BE CONCLUSIVE.:

34. BOMBS AND BOMBING WERE AMONG KISSINGER'S PRINCIPAL TOOLS IN TRYING TO DRIVE THE COMMUNISTS TO AGREEMENT AND

TRYING TO PERSUADE PRESIDENT NGUYEN VAN THIEU TO ACCEPT
UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 07 STATE 202422 TOSEC 100144

IT. SOME FORMER OFFICIALS BELIEVE AN IMPORTANT AIM OF THE CHRISTMAS BOMBING RAIDS OF 1972 WAS TO DEMONSTRATE TO THIEU THAT NIXON WOULD KEEP HIS SECRET PROMISE TO SEND BACK THE B52S IF HE SIGNED THE CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT AND THE COMMUNISTS LATER MOUNTED A MAJOR OFFENSIVE.

35. A FORMER AIDE QUOTES KISSINGER AS SAYING, "WE HAVE TO SHOW THEM WE CAN BE BRUTAL."

36. ANOTHER CONTROVERSIAL SHOW OF US ARMED MIGHT WAS THE NUCLEAR ALERT OF OCTOBER 1973, DURING THE YOM KIPPUR WAR. IT WAS DECIDED BY THE FAMOUS BOBTAILED NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING OF "KISSINGER, KISSINGER AND SCHLESINGER" --KISSINGER, WEARING HIS TWO HATS, AND DEFENSE SECRETARY JAMES R. SCHLESINGER--AND RATIFIED AFTERWARD BY PRESIDENT NIXON.

37. NO ONE YET KNOWS THE FACTS OF THE ALERT. SOME OBSERVERS NOW THINK IT WAS MORE TO PERSUADE THE ISRAELIS TO ACCEPT THE CEASE-FIRE THAN IT WAS A RESPONSE TO ANY IMMINENT SOVIET TROOP MOVEMENT. KISSINGER PROMISED TO TELL THE FULL STORY IN ABOUT A WEEK, BUT HE HAS NEVER DONE SO.

38. KISSINGER HAS BEEN ACCUSED BY SOME PENTAGON OFFICIALS OF ADVOCATING A B52 STRIKE AGAINST CAMBODIAN CITIES IN THE MAYAGUEZ CRISIS LAST MAY. A WHITE HOUSE OFFICIAL, HOWEVER, CALLS THIS A "BUM RAP."

39. ACCORDING TO THE PENTAGON VERSION, KISSINGER, BACKED BY VICE PRESIDENT NELSON A. ROCKEFELLER, PRESSED FOR THE USE OF THE BIG EIGHT-ENGINE BOMBERS IF IT WAS DECIDED TO START MILITARY OPERATIONS BEFORE THE CARRIER CORAL SEA REACHED THE ISLAND WHERE THE CAPTURED US MERCHANT SHIP WAS BEING HELD.

40. SCHLESINGER AND THE PRESENT CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, GEN. GEORGE S. BROWN, WERE SAID TO HAVE OPPOSED THE PLAN, AS DID THE INDIVIDUAL CHIEFS OF STAFF.

41. THE PLAN GOT SO FAR THAT THE PLANES WERE ON THE RUNWAYS IN GUAM, WITH THE BOMBS ON THE RACKS AND THE CREWS
UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 08 STATE 202422 TOSEC 100144

BESIDE THE PLANES, READY TO TAKE OFF IN SECONDS ON THE TWO-HOUR BOMB RUN. BUT, ACCORDING TO THIS VERSION, PRESIDENT FORD VETOED THE USE OF THE B52S.

42. KISSINGER'S VERSION, IT HAS BEEN LEARNED, IS THAT SOMEONE--APPARENTLY IN THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT--HAD MADE AN

ERROR IN COMPUTING THE ARRIVAL TIME OF THE CORAL SEA. KISSINGER, REALIZING THAT THE CARRIER COULD LAUNCH ITS PLANES WHILE STILL SOME DISTANCE AWAY, ASKED FOR A NEW

COMPUTATION AND TOLD THE PRESIDENT IT WAS SENSELESS TO PROCEED WITH THE B52 OPTION. THE PRESIDENT THEN SCRUBBED THE B52 PLAN, ALTHOUGH THE ALERT ON GUAM WAS NOT CANCELED FOR FEAR OF INDICATING US INDECISIVENESS IN THE CRISIS.

43. IN THE KISSINGER VERSION, KISSINGER THUS WAS THE PREVENTER RATHER THAN THE ADVOCATE OF AN ESCALATION OF THE INCIDENT THAT COULD HAVE INFLAMED A NEW NATIONAL DEBATE.

44. EVEN KISSINGER'S CRITICS ACKNOWLEDGE HIS BRILLIANCE AS A NEGOTIATOR. HE HAS A QUICK, ACQUISITIVE MIND. THOSE WHO HAVE WATCHED HIM BARGAIN SAY THAT HE OFTEN IS FAR BETTER PREPARED THAN THOSE WITH WHOM HE IS DEALING. ONE OF HIS FORMER AIDES SAYS THIS IS TRUE SIX OR SEVEN TIMES OUT OF 10.

45. SOME OF KISSINGER'S ADMIRERS, AS WELL AS HIS CRITICS, HOWEVER, FEAR THAT HIS DESIRE TO MAKE A DEAL CAN SOMETIMES LEAD HIM TO MAKE UNWISE CONCESSIONS OR MAKE A PUBLIC SHOW OF AGREEMENT BY CONCEALING BASIC DIFFERENCES.

46. THEY CITE HIS SETTLEMENT WITH NORTH VIETNAM'S LE DUC THO, IN WHICH KISSINGER GAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT PEACE HAD BEEN ACHIEVED WHILE, ON THE ONE HAND, PERMITTING NORTH VIETNAM TO CONTINUE TO KEEP ITS TROOPS IN SOUTH VIETNAM AND, ON THE OTHER, GIVING THE SAIGON GOVERNMENT AN EXTRA \$2 BILLION IN ARMS TO CONTINUE FIGHTING.

47. THEY CITE ALSO HIS DEAL WITH SEN. HENRY M. JACKSON OVER SOVIET EMIGRATION POLICIES, IN WHICH BOTH PARTIES UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 09 STATE 202422 TOSEC 100144

NOW SEEM TO HAVE GIVEN A PUBLIC IMPRESSION THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAD MADE PROMISES THAT IN FACT IT HAD NOT MADE.

48. TIMING AS WELL AS CONTENT OF KISSINGER'S DIPLOMATIC BREAKTHROUGHTS ALSO BOTHERS SOME STUDENTS OF DIPLOMACY. THEY POINT TO THE ABRUPT ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE NIXON TRIP TO CHINA, WHICH SO SHOCKED THE JAPANESE AND DAMAGED JAPANESE-AMERICAN RELATIONS, JUST IN TIME TO HELP WITH THE NIXON RE-ELECTION CAMPAIGN. ANOTHER EXAMPLE IS KISSINGER'S "PEACE IS AT HAND" SPEECH A FEW DAYS BEFORE THE 1972 ELECTION, WHEN, AS BECAME KNOWN LATER, THIEU WAS STILL ADAMANTLY BLOCKING AN AGREEMENT.

49. SUCH QUESTIONS CAUSE WORRY ABOUT WHAT FUTURE DEALS
KISSINGER MAY MAKE, IN THE MIDDLE EAST OR WITH THE
RUSSIANS OVER NUCLEAR WEAPONS--AGREEMENTS THAT COULD BE
SHAPING UP FOR ANNOUNCEMENT JUST IN TIME FOR EFFECTIVE
USE IN PRESIDENT FORD'S 1976 CAMPAIGN. (END TEXT) INGERSOLL

UNCLASSIFIED

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 26 AUG 1999
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: PRESS COMMENTS, TEXT, TOSEC
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 25 AUG 1975
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: n/a
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: n/a
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment:
Disposition Date: 01 JAN 1960
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1975STATE202422
Document Source: ADS
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: PA/M:JCHAMBERLAIN:JC
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: N/A
Errors: n/a
Film Number: D750294-0163
From: STATE
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1975/newtext/t197508102/baaaatbq.tel
Line Count: 387
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, TEXT ON MICROFILM
Office: ORIGIN PA
Original Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 8
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: n/a
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: hartledg
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 10 FEB 2003
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <10 FEB 2003 by ReddocGW>; APPROVED <27 JAN 2004 by hartledg>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
06 JUL 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: n/a
TAGS: SOPN, PFOR, US, XC, (DUDMAN, RIACHARD)
To: SECRETARY
Type: TE
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 06 JUL 2006